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Trade and the Competitiveness Agenda
José Guilherme Reis and Thomas Farole
Export-Led Growth, the Crisis, and the End 
of an Era
The dramatic expansion in global trade over recent decades
has contributed significantly to diversification, growth, and
poverty reduction in many developing countries. This period
of rapid export growth has been enabled by two critical
structural changes in global trade: (1) the vertical and spatial
fragmentation  of  manufacturing  into  highly  integrated
“global production networks,” and (2) the rise of services
trade and the growth of “offshoring.” Both of these, in turn,
were made possible by major technological revolutions; and
they were supported by multilateral trade policy reforms
and broad liberalizations in domestic trade and investment
environments worldwide.
The global economic crisis came crashing into the middle
of this long-running export-led growth party during 2008
and 2009. Between the last quarter of 2007 and the second
quarter of 2009, global trade contracted by 36 percent. But
as the recovery started to strengthen in 2010 (at least until
the clouds began to form over Europe), the longer-term im-
pacts of the crisis on the policy environment regarding trade
and growth were becoming more apparent. Indeed, in addi-
tion to raising concerns over the global commitment to trade
liberalization, the crisis has also led to some serious rethink-
ing  of  some  of  the  conventional  wisdom  regarding  the
growth agenda—the most important result of which is the
likelihood that governments will play a much more activist
role in the coming years. There are three principal reasons
why governments are likely to be more actively involved in
industrial and trade policy in the coming years. 
First, the crisis has undone faith in markets and discred-
ited laissez-faire approaches that rely simply on trade policy
liberalization. Instead, governments and local markets have
been “rediscovered.” In this sense, the demand for activist
government is likely to go well beyond financial markets and
regulation, and it will affect the policy environment in which
trade and industrial strategies are designed.
Second, the crisis has highlighted the critical importance
of diversification (of sectors, products, and trading partners)
in reducing the risks of growth volatility. The recent era of
globalization contributed to substantial specialization of
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and growth policy from the competitiveness angle, and it suggests some priorities for the new competitiveness agenda.many economies. Whereas this specialization was predicted
by trade theory, what perhaps was unexpected was the de-
gree of vertical specialization that emerged through “task-
based” trade in global production networks. As the next era
emerges, diversification will be at the top of the policy
agenda in most developing countries. This will create further
demand for government activism.
Finally, despite the dramatic rise of East Asia and India in
recent years, many developing countries have failed to ben-
efit from the opportunities afforded by liberalized trade over
the past quarter century. Even with the benefits of prefer-
ential market access, few exporters from low-income coun-
tries are in a position to compete in internaitonal markets
because of poor productivity, high trade costs, and the in-
ability to benefit from internal and external scale economies.
The Coming Era of Government Activism: 
Old Industrial Policy or a New
Competitiveness Agenda?
The demand for a more activist approach does raise the risk
of going back to old-style industrial policy associated with
the import-substitution era. One risk here is that the heavy
hand of government—in picking winners, in managing un-
realistic exchange rates, and in attempting to derive demand
through import substitution—will distort the market and
undermine private sector competitiveness in the long term.1
Further,  such  demand  for  protection—which  inevitably
would emerge through traditional industrial policies—even-
tually could undermine the gains made in trade liberalization
over recent decades. On the other hand, greater active gov-
ernment commitment also opens up the possibility of coun-
tries adopting a more comprehensive, competitiveness-based
approach to trade and growth. As Klinger (2010) points out,
firm productivity is determined in large part by public in-
puts to firms’ production and the good functioning of the
markets in which firms operate. Thus, government plays a
critical role in overcoming market failures. If done effec-
tively, government intervention can create the conditions
that enable the private sector to respond to market oppor-
tunities. As discussed in Rodríguez-Clare (2005), Harrison
and Rodríguez-Clare (2009), and Klinger (2010), these in-
terventions can include both policies to induce discovery (as
noted by Hausmann and Rodrik [2002]) and policies to pro-
mote the benefits of agglomeration (inspired by the seminal
work of Porter [1990]).
Thus, the demand for government activism need not lead
to a return to the days of old-style industrial policy. Instead,
it can result in a deepening of the competitiveness agenda
and a strengthening of support for private sector–led growth
by unlocking the constraints that discourage innovation, in-
vestments, and export diversification; and, at the same time,
facilitating the capacity for economywide adjustment. What
might this competitiveness approach look like? Much of it
would be familiar. For example, it would recognize the fun-
damental roles of human capital, sound macroeconomic
foundations, and basic institutions—like property rights, the
rule of law, and effective regulation—as the bases for long-
term growth. But it would go beyond these basic founda-
tions to address the microeconomic environment that shapes
individual firms’ capacities and the incentives to which they
respond. The competitiveness policy framework might be
described as one established on the following three pillars:
1. Aligning macroincentives—for example, removing eco-
nomic biases arising from tariff and nontariff barriers,
real exchange rate misalignment, and a distortive tax
regime; and ensuring the overall fiscal health of the
economy, efficient labor market operation, product and
factor market conditions, protection of property rights,
effective regulation, and ease of firm entry and exit.
2. Reducing trade-related costs—for example, improving
backbone services and inputs such as energy, telecom-
munications, finance; improving the capacity and co-
ordination  of  government  agencies  at  the  border,
international transit arrangements, regional and multi-
lateral agreements; and making policy reforms that en-
sure  more  competitive  markets  for  international
transport, logistics, and other services that facilitate
trade transactions.
3. Establishing proactive policies for overcoming government
and market failures—for example, promoting technology
creation and adaptation, developing product standards
and certifications, providing trade finance, supporting in-
dustry clusters, facilitating special economic zones and
other spatial developments, and ensuring coordination
of economic actors as well as links and spillovers to the
local economy.
Many of the issues on the agenda within this broad frame-
work of competitiveness are not new; indeed, governments
have always played an important role in addressing some of
them. However, with the growing postcrisis emphasis on
more proactive policies, several issues are likely to emerge
as priorities within the competitiveness agenda. These issues
are discussed in the remaining portion of this note.
Targeting T ransport and T rade Facilitation to
Reduce the Costs of Bringing Goods 
to Market
For exporters in many developing countries, competitive ad-
vantage at the factory and farm-gate is eroded step-by-step
in the miles between production and markets. Distance aside,
factors like transport and communications infrastructure,
border-related processes, and local logistics markets will play
critical roles in shaping exporters’ competitiveness through
their impact on cost, time, and supply chain reliability. Data
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Bank 2010) show a clear relationship between logistics per-
formance and exports (see figure 1). Empirical literature trac-
ing the effect of transport and trade facilitation constraints
on trade flows shows unequivocal impacts of time and costs
on developing-country exports (Djankov, Freund, and Pham
2006) and on the composition of trade (Li and Wilson 2009).
Taking up the competitiveness agenda, governments will
play an increasingly active role in trying to overcome trans-
port, trade facilitation, and logistics constraints. This action
will start by putting in place the hard and soft infrastructure
to facilitate the movement of goods. But it will also involve
more active efforts to identify and develop transport corri-
dors, to improve coordination across border clearance agen-
cies (both internally and in concert with trading partners),
to strengthen competition in local logistics markets, and to
work with the private sector to overcome coordination fail-
ures in export logistics and facilitate greater scale and pre-
dictability. In addition, given that export of services is a key
element of the trade diversification strategy in many devel-
oping countries, an expanded trade facilitation agenda also
must contemplate telecommunications and connectivity be-
cause maintaining and upgrading both the quantity and
quality of communications infrastructure are crucial for en-
suring the possibility of engaging in services trade.
Retooling Export Promotion to Support
Improved Export Survival
Government support for export promotion is based on the
significant information externalities and coordination fail-
ures that affect the private sector with respect to export
markets. Export promotion agencies (EPAs) have a long his-
tory in both high-income and developing economies. Al-
though they often have been criticized, recent research
shows they have generally had a positive effect on export
performance in developing countries (Lederman, Olarreaga,
and Payton 2009). In light of the changing trade dynamics
discussed in this note, however, there is likely to be a need
for EPAs to shift from their traditional focus on finding new
export market opportunities to supporting new and existing
exporters to increase survival rates during the first few years
after beginning to export. Indeed, as illustrated in figure 2,
survival rates in developing countries can be dramatically
lower than in high-income countries as a result of the many
additional barriers to competitiveness that they face (com-
pare Brenton, Pierola, and von Uexkull 2009).
Addressing the agenda of sustainability will require gov-
ernments to address a much wider set of issues. For example,
competing in high-value (usually perishable) agricultural ex-
ports may require support to ensure that standards and cer-
tification requirements are met on an industrywide level to
facilitate market access for new exporters. In the services
sector, which suffers from notorious information asymme-
tries, collective action on licensing and accreditation may be
necessary to enable competitiveness. Across virtually all sec-
tors, access to trade finance is critical to enable exporters to
enter and sustain participation in international markets. All
of this is likely to imply significant institutional changes in
the approach of EPAs—in particular, taking on a greater co-
ordination role and working more closely with other public
and private sector actors.
Using Special Economic Zones and Clusters
to Facilitate Externalities
As task-based trade and investment patterns have become
engrained in the global production system and the sources
of competition are highly globalized, addressing the chal-


































4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 1. Relationship between Logistics Performance and Exports
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from World Bank (2010) and the
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Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the United Nations
Commodity Trade Statistics database, using the World Bank’s World
Integrated Trade Solution software. 
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Figure 2. Comparison of Survival Rates of Exporters in Pakistan 
and Germany
Germanylenge of upgrading in developing countries will require fa-
cilitating better links between foreign direct investment and
the domestic private sector. This will require a greater em-
phasis on skills development. Beyond skills development,
however, there is an important role for governments to fa-
cilitate spillovers by promoting collaboration between local
producers and foreign buyers and by overcoming gaps in co-
ordination between the local private sector and institutions.
In this regard, governments are likely to put greater empha-
sis on spatial industrial policies in the years ahead.
One such policy instrument that has been used in many
developing countries are special economic zones, most com-
monly export processing zones. Such special economic zones
have played a valuable role in catalyzing industrialization and
trade integration, particularly in East Asia. However, the tra-
ditional  export-processing-zone  model  that  was  imple-
mented in most countries2—one reliant on low wages, trade
preferences, and substantial fiscal incentives—paid too little
attention to facilitating dynamic links with the local private
sector. A more innovative approach to using spatial industrial
policy will be part of the new agenda to support industrial
upgrading in developing countries. This approach will involve
the use of more flexible and integrated zones that combine
cluster-based development models with a host of policies de-
signed to facilitate links between foreign investors and the
local private sector. It will also involve support for the devel-
opment of public-private institutions that promote public
goods (for example, training, joint research, certification, and
market information) linked directly to local clusters.
Strengthening Competition Policy and
Institutions to Support Adjustment
Central to the aims of the trade policies discussed in this
note are facilitating and managing the dynamic process of
economic adjustment that is inherent in capturing the ben-
efits of trade. This requires redeploying resources (capital,
labor, institutions) to higher-value activities. The ability of
economies to adapt to a changing environment depends on
their degree of flexibility, not only at the more conventional
macroeconomic level, but also at the microeconomic level.
The  foundations  of  long-run  adjustment  are,  of  course,
human capital and innovation.3 But beyond this agenda
(and, indeed, intrinsicly linked to it), governments will focus
their industrial and trade policy increasingly on competition
and other actions to promote firm entry and exit. They also
will support adjustment capacity more broadly by building
and sustaining dense networks of high-quality and flexible
economic institutions.
Competition policy plays a critical role in facilitating
entry and exit (both in product and factor markets), which
Aghion and Howitt (2006) show to be the primary channel
through which economic adjustment processes occur in a
Schumpeterian  growth  paradigm.  But  competition,  al-
though generally acknowledged as an important element of
the growth agenda, is often relegated to a kind of second- or
third-priority level. And industrial policies that engage in
building “national champions” are frequently at odds with
competition policy—thereby contributing to their long-run
welfare deficits.
Finally, delivering on the competitiveness agenda will rely
on the existence of effective institutions, including those of the
state, of the private sector, and of civil society. Acemoglu, John-
son, and Robinson (2004) argue that institutions—the “rules
of the game” in a society (North 1991)—are the fundamental
“deep determinants” of economic growth and development
differences across countries because they ultimately shape in-
centives for innovation and entrepreneurship and set the main
constraints for societies to adapt. Indeed, the fundamental role
of institutions in a society—to facilitate cooperation and col-
lective action among individual (economic) agents—is to ad-
dress the market and coordination failures that are the bases
for the “new” competitiveness agenda discussed in this note.
But institutions are endogenous, and so can also act as barriers
to adjustment by blocking reform (Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi
2002; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). And weak institutions
may have negative influence on the provision of public goods
and on the development and delivery of policies aimed at im-
proving skills or innovation capacity or other potential sources
of growth. Therefore, the development of “thick” networks
(Amin and Thrift 1994) of flexible and reform-minded insti-
tutions that promote cooperation and knowledge sharing
across the public and private sectors will be the key to estab-
lishing a governance framework that is suited to the new era
of competitiveness.
Notes
1. Noland and Pack (2003) survey a series of studies
showing that, contrary to popular belief, industrial policy in
East Asia was not successful in supporting high-growth sec-
tors. The sectors that received the most support in terms of
subsidies, tax breaks, and protection in Japan, the Republic
of Korea, and Taiwan, China, were not the ones that later
showed the most growth. 
2. It is worth noting that many of the successful East
Asian countries (most notably Korea and Malaysia) did im-
plement much more dynamic models of special economic
zones, with an explicit focus on facilitating spillovers. 
3. See Glaeser (2003, 2008) for an ample discussion of
the role of human capital in cities’ recovery from and adap-
tation  to  external  shocks—particularly,  how  it  helped
Boston, Massachusetts, reinvent itself. 
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